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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
son, offered no evidence, but he contended: that the prosecution had
failed to establish a prima facie case against him; and that Section 435
of the Charter of the City of New York 1 was unconstitutional, ergo
the police commissioner had no authority to regulate parking, and the
magistrate acquired no jurisdiction. Held, that the defendant was
guilty of the traffic infracti6nis with which he was charged. People v.
Rubin, 284 N. Y. 392, 31 N. E. (2d) 501 (1940).
In scholastic fashion the defendant argued that from the facts
proved by the prosecution, iAz., that the defendant was the registered
owner of an automobile which had been unlawfully parked, one could
not infer that the defendant was a traffic infractor. Such an inference,
asserted the defendant, rebuts itself because, if a man were the regis-
tered owner of two or more automobiles which were unlawfully parked
simultaneously, since it is physically impossible for one man to operate
more than one automobile at one time, it could not logically be inferred
that the registered owner of two or more automobiles committed more
than one of such traffic infractions simultaneously. The court pointed
out that the evidence showed that the defendant owned only one auto-
mobile, therefore his reasoning did not apply to his own case. As the
defendant offered no evidence to refute the inference which was raised
against him, the inference prevailed.2 A rebuttable presumption,
similar to the rebuttable inference in question, exists in civil cases,a and
such an inference has been utilized in the criminal law. 4
Although it had previously been adjudicated a constitutional dele-
gation of legislative power,5 the defendant averred that Section 345 of
the Charter of the City of New York authorized the police commis-
sioner to regulate traffic, but not parking. The court decided, how-
ever, that the power to regulate traffic necessarily includes the power
to regulate parking, 6 hence the police commissioner was empowered to
.regulate parking by implication. 7  The defendant urged that the sec-
iN. Y. CITY CHARTER § 435 ("The police department and force shall have
the power and it shall be their duty to ... regulate, direct, control and restrict
the movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic for the facilitation of traffic
and the convenience of the public as well as the proper protection of human life
and health ... The commissioner shall make such rules and regulations for the
conduct of pedestrian and vehicular traffic in the use of the public streets,
squares and avenues as he may deem necessary ... The violation of such rules
and regulations shall be triable by a city magistrate and punishable by not more
than thirty days' imprisonment or by a fine of not more than fifty dollars, or
both.").
2 People v. Dyle, 21 N. Y. 578 (1860).
3 Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249, 108 N. E. 406 (1915) ; Piwowarski v.
Cornwell, 273 N. Y. 226, 7 N. E. (2d) 111 (1937).
4 Commonwealth v: Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N. E. 601 (1934); People v.
Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N. W. 248 (1938); People v. Marchetti, 154 Misc.
147, 276 N. Y. Supp. 708 (1934).
5 Cherubino v. Meenan, 253 N. Y. 462, 171 N. E. 708 (1930).6 People v. Lewis, 167 Misc. 139, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 508 (1938).
7 N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW Art. VI (entitled in part: "Provisions
9 Applying to Highway Traffic . . .") ; N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 86("Parking . . ." is part of the title, and § 86 is within art. VI).
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tion in question was unconstitutional, nevertheless, for it deprived him
of a trial by jury.8 In this respect the Federal Constitution does not
apply to trials in the state courts.9 The court by relating the New
York Constitution to the Vehicle and Traffic Law and the Penal Law,
clearly demonstrated that the defendant had not suffered any substan-
tial impairment of his constitutional rights.10
A. C. H.
UNEMPLOYMENT "INSURANCE - BENEFITS - DISTINCTION BE-
TWEEN AN EMPLOYEE AND AN INDEPENDENT CONTRAcTo.-This is a
proceeding in the matter of the claim of Margaret Morton against the
Spirella Co., Inc. for unemployment insurance benefits under the
Unemployment Insurance Law.1 Respondent manufactures and sells
made-to-order ladies' undergarments. Claimant was engaged as a
cors~tifre pursuant to a written contract which in part provided as
follows: the company agreed to grant an exclusive sales territory to
claimant, to give her the benefit of the company's training in corsetry
and salesmanship; to furnish her with the company's products at the
prices published in the company's wholesale price list, etc. By the
express terms of the contract, claimant was obligated to pursue respon-
8 U. S. CONsT. Art. III, § 2 (". . . trial of all crimes shall be by jury.");
N. Y. CONST. Art. VI, § 18 ("Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore
been guaranteed by constitutional provisions shall remain inviolate forever;
9 Eilenberker v. Plymouth'County, 134 U. S. 31, 10 Sup. Ct. 424 (1890).10 N. Y. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 18 ("Courts of Special Sessions and inferior local
courts of similar character shall have such jurisdiction of offenses of the grade
of misdemeanors as may be prescribed by law, and the legislature may authorize
them to try such offenses without a jury."); N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW
§ 2(29) (". . . no jury trial shall be allowed for traffic infractions.") ; N. Y.
PENA LAW § 2(6) (". . . traffic infractions . . . are not crimes."); Matter
of Cooley v. Wilder, 234 App. Div. 256, 255 N. Y. Supp. 218 (4th Dept. 1932).
2 N. Y. LABOR LAW § 502.
"Definitions. As used in this article:
1. 'Employment', except where the context shows otherwise, means any
employment under any contract of hire, express or implied, written or
oral, including all contracts entered into by helpers and assistants of
employees, whether paid by employer or employee, if employed with
the knowledge actual or constructive of the employer, in which all or
the greater part of the work is to be performed within this state....
But for the purposes of this article, 'employment' shall not include:
(1) Employment as a farm laborer;
(2) Employment by an employer of his spouse or minor child.
2. 'Employee' means any person, including aliens and minors, employed
for hire by an employer in an employment subject to this article,
except any person whose wages exceed three thousand dollars in any
calendar year." (L. 1935, c. 468.)
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dent's methods of corsetry and salesmanship, and, as a matter of prac-
tice, was expected to begin her day's work at 9 A. M. and to work at
least thirty hours a week. The modeling garments, samples, and
advertising literature were supplied by respondent, and had to be
returned upon termination of the contract; claimant's calling card was
imprinted with her name together with that of respondent's; a report
card had to be filed each week showing claimant's daily activities, and
she was required to attend the school of instruction conducted by
respondent's manager. The sole question to be determined is whether
claimant is an employee or independent contractor of the respondent
company. Held, the Appeal Board 2 was warranted in determining
that claimant was an employee, and not an independent contractor.
In re Morton, 284 N. Y. 167, 30 N. E. (2d) 369 (1940).
While an employer may elect to engage an independent contractor
rather than an employee, no written agreement relating to employment
may preclude an examination by the Appeal Board to determine
whether the actual relationship is such as to bring the parties within
the scope of the law.3 The power and duty of weighing the evidence
does not rest with the courts for, by virtue of the statute, it has been
placed upon the administrative authority which acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity.4 In referring to the procedure under a parallel statute it has
been said that the board's findings of fact, if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive. Where there is conflict in the testimony produced
or where reasonable men might differ as to the credibility of testimony,
the duty of weighing the evidence and making the choice rests solely
upon the board.5 This rule has been applied in recent cases arising
before the National Labor Relations Board, the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.6
2 The state establishes an Appeal Board of three members appointed by the
governor.
3 Instant case, 30 N. E. (2d) at 372.
4 N. Y. LABOR LAw § 534 ("A decision of a referee under any provision
of the article, if not appealed from, shall be final on all questions of fact and
law. A decision of the Appeal Board shall be final on all questions of fact and
unless appealed from, shall be final on all questions of law").
5 Matter of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 26 N. E. (2d)
247 (1940).
6 United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 235 U. S. 314, 35 Sup. Ct.
113 (1914) ; Fed. Trade Comm. v. Pac. States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U. S. 52,
47 Sup. Ct. 255 (1927); Fed. Trade Comm. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S.
67, 54 Sup. Ct. 315 (1933) ; Florida, et al. v. United States, 292 U. S. 1, 54 Sup.
Ct. 603 (1934) (involving a finding of the Interstate Commerce Commission) ;
Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 142, 57
Sup. Ct. 648 (1937); Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197,
59 Sup. Ct. 206 (1938); Agwilines, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 87 F. (2d) 146 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1936) ; N. L. R. B. v. Wallace Mfg. Co., 95 F. (2d) 818 (C. C. A. 4th,
1938) ; N. L. R. B. v. Ky. Fire Brick Co., 99 F. (2d) 89 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) ;
N. L. R. B. v. Nebel Knitting Co., 103 F. (2d) 594 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. N. L. R. B., 112 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940);
N. L. R. B. v. Skinner & Kennedy S. Co., 113 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940);
Matter of Chetney v. Manning Co., 273 N. Y. 82, 6 N. E. (2d) 105 (1937);
RECENT DECISIONS
The distinction between an employee and an independent con-
tractor is as follows: the employee is one' who undertakes to achieve
an agreed result and to accept the directions of his employer as to
manner in which the result shall be accomplished; the independent
contractor is one who agrees to achieve a certain result but is not
subject to the orders of his employer as to the means which are used.7
The absence of any right on the part of the employer to control the
manner in which the stipulated work is to be done is, in many instances,
treated as the sole indicium of the independence of the contract.8
Because such a distinction has occasioned criticism, the following brief
and simple formula has been proposed: "An independent contractor
is a person employed to perform work on the terms that he is to be
free from the control of the employer as respects the manner in which
the details of the work are to be executed." 9
In interpretation of the New York Unemployment Insurance
Law, the Division of Placement and Unemployment Insurance has
said: "In defining 'independent person' generally the precedent laid
down by the courts in workmen's compensation cases will be followed:
generally an independent person does the work of the principal with
whom he contracts without supervision by such principal as to his
method of doing it and has his own financial responsibility. He usu-
ally receives a lump sum agreed upon in advance rather than pay by
the day or hour and is not bound to regular hours of work, nor subject
to discharge." 10 The general concept evolved by a long line of tort
cases and expressed by many eminent writers on the subject has been
Met. Life Ins. Co. v. N. Y. State Labor Relations Bd.., 280 N. Y. 194, 20 N. E.
390 (1939).
7 P. T. Collier & Son Co. v. Hartfeil, 72 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934);
Miss. River Fuel Corp. v. Young, 188 Ark. 575, 67 S. W. (2d) 581 (1934);
May v. Farrell, 94 Cal. App. 703, 271 Pac. 789 (1929) ; Wight v. H. G. Christ-
man Co., 244 Mich. 208, 221 N. W. 314 (1928) ; Hexamer v. Webb, 101 N. Y.
377, 4 N. E. 755 (1886).
"What then is the test of this distinction between a servant and an indepen-
dent contractor? The test is the existence of the right of control over the agent
in respect of the manner in which his work is to be done. A servant is an
agent who works under the supervision and direction of his employer; an inde-
pendent contractor is one who is his own master. The servant is a person
engaged to obey his employer's orders from time to time; an independent con-
tractor is one who is a person engaged to do certain work, but to exercise his
own discretion as to the mode and time of doing it ... he is bound by his con-
tract but not by his employer's orders." Instant case, 284 N. Y. at 172, citing
SALMOND, ToRTs.
8 "The employment is regarded as independent when the person renders
service in the course of an occupation representing the will of his employer only
as to the result of his work, and not as to the means by which it is accom-
plished." 4 MECHEM, AGENCY (1st ed. 1888) § 747, quoted with approval in
Bibb v. Norfolk & W. R. R., 87 Va. 711, 14 S. E. 163 (1891).
"An independent contractor is one who undertakes to produce a given result,
but so that in the actual execution of the work he is not under the order or
control of the person for whom he does it, and may use his own discretion in
things not specified beforehand." PoLLAcx, ToRTs (11th ed.) 80.
9 Note (1922) 19 A. L. R. 226.
10 1 C. C. H., N. Y. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV. (1937) § 7215.
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applied to cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation Law."
The same rule also has been applied to cases arising under the Unem-
ployment Insurance Law, the result in the particular cases depending
upon the facts present in each instance,12 and also to unemployment
insurance cases in other jurisdictions.'" It can be seen from the
nature of the problem that the degree of control which must be reserved
by the employer in order to create the employer-employee relationship
cannot be stated in terms of mathematical precision, and that various
aspects of the relation may be considered in arriving at the conclusion
in a particular case. 14
R.G.
"N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 23; Matter of Beach v. Velzy,
238 N. Y. 100, 143 N. E. 805 (1924) ; Matter of Pierce v. Bowen, 247 N. Y. 305,
160 N. E. 379 (1928); Matter of Glielmi v. Netherland Dairy Co., 254 N. Y.
60, 171 N. E. 906 (1930).
12 Compare Matter of Scatola, 282 N. Y. 689, 26 N. E. (2d) 815 (1940),
with Matter of Levine, 283 N. Y. 577, 27 N. E. (2d) 439 (1940).
'3 Jack & Jill, Inc. v. Tone, 126 Conn. 114, 9 A. (2d) 497 (1939) ; Schomp
v. Fuller Brush Co., 124 N. J. L. 487, 12 A. (2d) 702 (1940).
14 Instant case, 284 N. Y. at 173, citing RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 220.
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